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Sammendrag 
Tildeling av gratis utslippskvoter kan påvirke bedrifters insentiver til å investere i ren 
produksjonsteknologi. I denne artikkelen undersøker vi effektene av gratis tildeling proporsjonalt med 
produksjon.  Det innebærer at bedriftene mottar flere gratis utslippskvoter dersom de øker 
produksjonen sin. Vi viser at slik tildeling kan stimulere til renere teknologi, så lenge bedriftene ikke 
forventer en tilstramming i tildelingsregelen som følge av sine investeringer. Forklaringen er at 
gratiskvotene utgjør en subsidie til bedriftenes produksjon. Den enkelte bedrift vil derfor ønske å 
produsere mer, og dermed øke sine utslipp. Dette gir økt kvotepris, som igjen gir sterkere insentiver til 
å investere i ren teknologi. Dersom bedriftene forventer en tilstramming i tildelingsregelen som følge 
av sine investeringer vil imidlertid disse insentivene svekkes. Denne svekkelsen kan være så sterk at 
investeringer i ren teknologi faller. 
1 Introduction
One of the most important questions with regards to emission trading sys-
tems (ETS) is how to allocate the emission quotas or allowances. Should
allowances be auctioned, or allocated freely to emitting rms? Although
economists often argue in favour of auctioning,1 most ETSs to date, such as
the SO2 trading program in the U.S. and the EU ETS for greenhouse gas
emissions, have mostly relied on free allocation. What is then the best allo-
cation mechanism? The answer to this question is not straightforward, and
depends crucially on the purpose of allocation.
In this paper we are concerned with the following question: How do dif-
ferent allocation mechanisms a¤ect investments in clean technologies, i.e.,
technologies that reduce the emission intensities of installations regulated by
the ETS. Our reference is an ETS based on either auctioning or lump sum
allocation of allowances, such as (unconditional) grandfathering.2 As shown
1An important argument for auctioning of permits is that the revenues can be used
to reduce other distorting taxes in the economy, the so-called double dividend (e.g., see
Goulder, 1995; Hoel, 1998; or Goulder et al., 1999).
2In the literature, the term grandfathering has mostly been used to describe uncondi-
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already by Montgomery (1972), such an ETS will be cost-e¤ective, given
that the emission trading market is not distorted by e.g. market power, in-
complete participation or distortive taxes. We compare this reference ETS
with a system where allowances are allocated in proportion to rmspro-
duction levels. That is, all rms producing the same product receive the
same number of allowances for every unit of production. Such an allocation
mechanism is often referred to as benchmarking or output-based allocation
(e.g., see Edwards and Hutton, 2001; Fischer and Fox, 2007), and has become
increasingly popular in recent years as a way of reducing emissions leakage
and loss in competitiveness (see below).
Why do we focus on investments in clean technologies? Technological
improvements have been essential in handling environmental problems such
as acid rain and depletion of the ozone layer, and may be even more important
in dealing with the climate change problem. Reaching ambitious climate
goals, such as the two degrees target agreed upon in the Copenhagen Accord
in 2009,3 will be immensely costly without substantial technological progress
tional allocation based on historic activity levels such as emissions. We will follow that
terminology, even though most current ETSs, such as the EU ETS, typically includes
conditions to grandfathered allocations (e.g., the condition to not close the installation).
3See http://unfccc.int/home/items/5262.php.
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over the next few decades. Naturally, incentives to do R&D in climate-
friendly technologies are to a large degree driven by the prospects to sell such
technologies (see, e.g., Griliches, 1957; or Ruttan 2001). Given that there
are positive externalities from R&D that are not su¢ ciently internalized,
the impacts on clean technology investments of di¤erent kinds of regulation
should therefore be of interest. This is not to say, however, that one allocation
mechanism is better than another simply because it leads to more investments
in clean technologies. Obviously, other crucial aspects like cost-e¢ ciency and
distributional e¤ects matter as well.
Using a simple analytical model, we show that output-based allocation
tends to increase the incentives to invest in clean technologies under ex ante
regulation, that is, if the allocation rule is not adjusted as a result of the rms
investment levels. Consider a sector consisting of homogenous rms, with a
sector-specic benchmark parameter determining the number of allowances
allocated per unit of production. If the benchmark parameter is increased
for only this sector, keeping the total emissions cap xed, we nd that clean
technology investments in this sector will unambiguously rise under ex ante
regulation. The explanation is that output-based allocation, acting as an
implicit output subsidy, drives up production and hence emissions in this
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sector. This further leads to a higher price of allowances and increased in-
centives to invest in clean technologies. The e¤ects on investments in other
sectors regulated by the same ETS are ambiguous, as lower emissions in these
sectors and higher allowance price pull in di¤erent directions.
Under ex post regulation, the regulator may respond to the rmsinvest-
ments, noticing that the emission intensities of the rms have come down,
by reducing the number of allowances allocated per unit of output. If so, the
anticipated future loss of free allowances may reduce the rms incentives
to invest in cleaner technologies. Obviously, this depends on whether the
individual rm considers its own action to be of importance for the regula-
tors decision, which is more likely if the benchmark parameter referred to
above only applies to a small number of rms. If this so-called ratcheting
e¤ect (Downing and White, 1986) is su¢ ciently strong, it may outweigh the
positive e¤ects on investments described above, leading to less investments
than under auctioning or grandfathering. In general, however, the e¤ects on
clean technology investments are ambiguous under ex post regulation.
We also examine the case with heterogeneous rms within a sector, and
consider how di¤erent types of sectors may be a¤ected di¤erently with respect
to technology investments by output-based allocation. In addition, in a brief
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extension we analyze output-based refunding of emissions payments, i.e., an
emissions tax with refunding based on production.
The development of the EU ETS, which is by far the most important ETS
in the world today (both in economic and political terms),4 illustrates how
output-based allocation has gained momentum lately. The allocation mech-
anism in the EU ETS will shift substantially from the rst (2005-2007) and
the second (2008-2012) phases to the third phase in 2013-2020. In the rst
two phases, allocation was mainly based on historic emission levels, setting
aside allocation reserves for new installations without historic emissions. In
the upcoming phase, power producers will no longer receive free allowances
(with some exceptions though). Allocation to other sectors will, as a gen-
eral rule, be based on historic production (in the years 2007-2008). New
installations and installations that change their capacity substantially will
receive special treatment, meaning that allocation will be adjusted accord-
ing to actual production capacity. For every subsector, the EU establishes a
benchmark parameter, which determines how many allowances each instal-
lation in this subsector will receive for every unit produced. The benchmark
4See http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm. The annual value of al-
lowances in the EU ETS has been estimated to 30 billion Euro (Neuho¤ et al., 2006).
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parameters are based on the emission intensities in the ten per cent least
emission-intensive installations in the respective subsectors in 2007-2008.
In the cap-and-trade system passed by the U.S. House of Representatives
in 2009,5 output-based allocation also plays an important role for some sec-
tors, especially energy-intensive and trade-exposed industries. However, this
bill has not been passed by the Senate, and the future of U.S. cap-and-trade
is currently highly uncertain.
Why is output-based allocation getting this momentum? The rationale
is clearly spelled out by the EU Commission. All sectors except the power
sector have been divided into two groups according to their exposure to
carbon leakage, i.e., increased emissions outside the EU as a result of emission
reductions within the EU. Sectors that are highly exposed to leakage will
receive more allowances than other sectors. Output-based allocation targets
leakage through product markets by indirectly subsidizing output in exposed
industries, reducing foreign rmsincentives to enhance their production and
thus emissions.6 Therefore, although output-based allocation is not a cost-
5The American Clean Energy and Security Act (H.R. 2454)
(http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20090701/hr2454_house.pdf)
6Carbon leakage may occur through di¤erent channels. According to Böhringer et al.
(2010), changes in international prices of fossil fuels are more important for the overall
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e¤ective way of reducing emissions (cf. e.g. Böhringer and Lange, 2005a), it
may be preferable in a world of open economies and sub-global environmental
policies (Fischer and Fox, 2007; Böhringer et al., 2010).
There exist some studies that examine the e¤ects of output-based alloca-
tion on, e.g., economic welfare, competitiveness and leakage. For instance,
using a general equilibrium model for the Danish economy, Jensen and Ras-
mussen (2000) show that output-based allocation dampens sectoral adjust-
ment, but causes larger welfare losses than lump-sum allocation (grandfa-
thering). Haites (2003) nds that output-based allocation in an ETS for
Alberta (Canada) encourages greater production but lower rm prots, rela-
tive to lump-sum allocation. Fischer and Fox (2007) nds that output-based
allocation is close to full auctioning with revenue recycling in terms of over-
all economic indicators, and clearly outperforms lump-sum allocation. The
reason is that allocation rules that stimulate output, mitigate concerns like
emissions leakage and tax interactions. Bernard et al. (2007) nd that it is
better to tax production in a competing unregulated sector than to rebate
environmental levies to rms in the regulated sector to mitigate emissions
leakage. If this is not possible, rebating is only justied when the goods of
leakage than leakage through the international markets for energy-intensive products.
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the sectors are close substitutes with similar emissions proles.
Output-based refunding of emissions payments is examined by Sterner
and Isaksson (2006), with the Swedish NOx charge as an example. They nd
that incentives for abatement are approximately equal to that of an emis-
sions tax, while reduction in output is smaller. Fischer and Fox (2009) use
an optimal tax framework to solve for the optimal emissions tax and output
rebate, given emissions leakage and distorting labor taxes. By mitigating
price increases of covered sector products, rebates reduce both the interac-
tion with pre-existing taxes and the loss of competitiveness that can lead
to leakage. Thus, they nd that the optimal rebate is larger for goods with
high substitutability with other unregulated goods, or goods that are strong
complements with employment
As far as we know, no previous studies have looked into how di¤erent
allocation mechanisms a¤ect investments in clean technologies. However,
there exists a well developed literature on R&D and incentives to invest in
abatement technology under emissions trading (with auctioned or grandfa-
thered permits) and other policy instruments. We refer to Ja¤e et al. (2002),
Löschel (2002) or Requate (2005) for surveys of this literature.
In Section 2 we set up and solve the analytical model. Subsection 2.1
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derives some short run properties of output-based allocation. These proper-
ties are necessary for our analysis of the forward looking rmsinvestment
decisions in Subsection 2.2. Section 3 and Section 4 provides extensions to
heterogeneous rms and output-based refunding of an emissions tax, respec-
tively. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical analysis
We consider an emission trading system (ETS) that coversm sectors, denoted
j 2 M = f1; 2; :::;mg, each producing a homogenous product qj to the
world market with market price pj. We assume that the area covered by
the ETS constitutes a su¢ ciently small part of the world market to leave
the price on the good produced exogenous.7 In sector j there are nj rms,
denoted i 2 N j = f1; 2; :::; njg, which we assume have identical cost functions
and hence activity levels. Let qj and ej denote production and emissions
for each rm in sector j, respectively, while kj are technology parameters.8
7Our results easily generalize to the case with an endogenous price and price-taking
rms, e.g., pj(Qj), with Qj = njqj and pj1  0. However, our results will be a¤ected if
the product price is not independent across sectors, and the e¤ect will then depend on the
specication of the dependency, e.g., if the goods produced are substitutes or compliments.
8We omit the rm specic i, because rms are identical within each sector.
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The production technology for rms in sector j is then summarized by the
cost function cj(qj; kjej), with cj1 > 0; c
j
2  0; cj11; cj22; cj12  0 ; cj11cj22  
(cj12)
2 > 0; and cj1(0; 0) < p
j.9 Except for the presence of the technology
parameter kj, these are standard assumptions (cf., e.g., Böhringer and Lange,
2005b). We notice that a higher kj goes along with lower emissions for a given
combination of production and cost. In other words: Let ej(qj; kj) denote
unabated emissions, i.e., the level of emissions that minimizes costs for given
production and technology levels. Then a higher kj implies that ej(qj; kj)
is reduced for any level of qj. Moreover, marginal costs of abatement are
reduced for any combination of qj and ej when kj is increased.
We further assume that both the product markets and the ETS market
are competitive.10 The product markets may consist of rms outside the ETS
in addition to the rms within the ETS. This could be the case if the ETS is
a subglobal trading system that (also) covers trade exposed industries (the
EU ETS is a prominent example).
The regulator commits to a binding aggregate emissions capE =
P
j2M n
jej.
9We use the shorthand notation fx to denote the derivative of the function f() with
respect to its xth argument.
10Results by Joskow et al. (1998) and Convery and Redmond (2007) indicate respec-
tively that the US market for SO2 emissions and the EU ETS are competitive.
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Further, the regulator allocates permits to individual rms proportional to
their production level (i.e., output-based allocation), with j being the allo-
cation factor. As seen below, the permit price  is a¤ected not only by the
emissions cap but also by the allocation factors.
The model is divided into two stages: First, in the beginning of stage 1,
the regulator announces the emissions cap and the allocation rules for stage
2. Based on these announcements, all rms choose their technology levels as
captured by kj in stage 1. Technology investment costs are determined by
the functions (kj), with 1 > 0 and 11  0.
We consider two possible game proles in stage 2: The ex ante regulation
game and the ex post regulation game. Under ex ante regulation, the regu-
lator credibly commits in the beginning of stage 1 to some xed allocation
factors j for stage 2. We then derive the rmsprots and activity levels in
stage 2 conditioned on their investments in stage 1 and the xed emissions
cap and allocation factors.
In contrast, under ex post regulation the regulator does not commit to
any allocation factor until after stage 1. Instead, the regulator announces at
the beginning of stage 1 that the allocation factors in stage 2 will be based
on observations of the rmstechnology choices in stage 1. An alternative
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interpretation of ex post regulation could be that the regulator is not able
to commit to the announced allocation factor, and thus the rms expect the
allocation factor to be updated before the start of stage 2.
Under ex post regulation, we let the allocation factor in sector j in stage
2 be given by j = jf( 1
nj
P
i2Nj k
i), with df
dki
< 0.11 The interpretation
here is that a higher sector specic constant j > 0 implies a more generous
allocation rule, and we will thus refer to j as the generosity parameter. Fur-
ther, f() captures the regulators possible response to the rmstechnology
investments (ratcheting). An increase in kj reduces the rms (unabated)
emissions per unit of production. With ex post regulation, the regulator
may respond to this new information by reducing the number of free permits
per unit produced in the subsequent stage 2 (e.g., because less free permits
is perceived necessary to avoid loss in competitiveness).
Note that there is an element of imperfect information in the ex post
game, as the knowledge gained from observations of rmstechnology choices
in stage 1 is used to decide the allocation factors before the beginning of stage
2. We assume that the rms are able to foresee these allocation factors, based
on the announcements made at the start of stage 1, when they choose their
11All the main results carry over with more general assumptions about the function f().
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investment levels in stage 1.
We solve the model backwards to nd the subgame perfect equilibrium.
Note that the allocation factors are given when the rms choose their produc-
tion and emissions levels in stage 2. Hence, the analyses of ex ante regulation
and ex post regulation are merged in Subsection 2.1 below.
2.1 The production and abatement decisions
In stage 2 rm i 2 N j in sector j 2 M maximizes prots with respect to
production qj and emissions ej, given technology kj:
j  max
qj ;ej

pjqj   cj(qj; kjej)  (ej   jqj) (1)
Note that prices pj and  are exogenous to the rm, which is also the
case for the allocation factor j in this stage. The strict convexity of the cost
function ensures that j is strictly concave in qj and ej. The corresponding
rst order conditions are:
pj + j = cj1(q
j; kjej) (2)
 =  kjcj2(qj; kjej) (3)
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which are equal across all rms within sector j for a given and equal tech-
nology parameter kj. Here, qj and ej refer to the optimal production and
emissions of rm i 2 N j. We observe that marginal costs of production are
equal across all rms within a sector if and only if the sector-specic alloca-
tion factor is identical for all these rms. This would remain true without
the assumption about identical rms within sectors. By totally di¤erentiat-
ing the rst order conditions (2) and (3) with respect to the permit price 
and the allocation factor j, we get (see the appendix):
0BB@ dq
j
dj
dqj
d
dej
dj
dej
d
1CCA = 1Xj
0BB@ (kj)2cj22 + (j(kj)2cj22   ) ddj j(kj)2cj22   
2 + (j   cj11) ddj j   cj11
1CCA ;
(4)
where Xj = (kj)2

cj11c
j
22   (cj12)2

> 0. The matrix on the LHS is the
substitution matrix. It describes how the rmscontrol variables qj and ej
are a¤ected by the allocation factor j and the permit price .
Let us rst examine the e¤ects of a change in the permit price, which
could, e.g., arise from an adjustment of the allocation factor in another sector.
These e¤ects are given in the second columns in the matrixes in equation (4).
We see that for su¢ ciently small j we have de
j
d
< 0 and dq
j
d
< 0. This would
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of course be the case with full auctioning, in which case the allocation factors
are equal to zero. For higher levels of j, however, it is possible that dq
j
d
> 0
and even de
j
d
> 0. The latter requires the allocation factor and the permit
price to be su¢ ciently big. The reason is that the allocation factor acts as a
subsidy to production, and the value of this subsidy increases with the permit
price. A higher permit price obviously makes emissions more expensive, too,
and the net e¤ects on output and emissions depend on the size of j as well
as the production technology. Below we will assume that j   cj11 < 0, so
that emissions are decreasing in the permit price.12
Next we consider the e¤ects in sector j of a more generous allocation factor
j. These e¤ects are given in the rst columns in the matrixes in equation
(4). Beginning with de
j
dj
, and given the assumption that j   cj11 < 0, we
see that the combination de
j
dj
< 0 and d
dj
 0 is infeasible. If we assume that
d
dj
> 0, then we have just established that emissions from rms in other
sectors el (l 2 Mn fjg) must fall. It then follows that dej
dj
> 0 in order to
reach the emissions cap. If we instead assume that d
dj
< 0, then emissions
in other sectors must increase, and thus de
j
dj
< 0. However, we have just
12If the allocation factor is so high that there exists an equilibrium where emissions
increase when the price of emissions increases, it can be shown that there also exists an
equilibrium with lower production such that emissions decrease when the price increases.
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ruled out this combination. d
dj
= 0 is also infeasible, as (4) then implies
dej
dj
> 0 and unchanged emissions in other sectors. Hence, we have proved
that we must have de
j
dj
> 0 and d
dj
> 0. Not surprisingly, as output-based
allocation acts as a subsidy to production, it then follows from equation (3)
that dq
j
dj
> 0.
We sum up our ndings in the following lemma, which holds as long as
dej
d
< 0:
Lemma 1 Increasing the allocation factor j in sector j 2 M leads to (for
xed levels of kj):
i) Higher price of permits ( d
dj
> 0)
ii) Increased emissions and production in sector j ( de
j
dj
> 0 and dq
j
dj
> 0)
iii) Decreased emissions and production in other sectors l 6= j for su¢ -
ciently low levels of l ( de
l
dj
< 0 and dq
l
dj
< 0, 8l 2Mn fjg)
Proof. The Lemma follows from the discussion above.
In particular, we notice that introducing output-based allocation, i.e.,
increasing j from zero, the price of permits will increase. This holds whether
output-based allocation is introduced for one or more sectors. If output-based
allocation is introduced for all sectors simultaneously, the e¤ects on emissions
in one particular sector is ambiguous, but we know that total emissions will
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have to remain unchanged. The e¤ects on production in a single sector is
also ambiguous, but production must rise in sectors with unchanged or higher
emissions (cf. equation 3). We last note that production will increase in all
sectors if the allocation factors are adjusted so as to keep sector emissions
unchanged.
2.2 The investment decision
At the beginning of stage 1, rms maximize prots with respect to technology
kj, given their knowledge of the equilibria in stage 2:
j  max
kj

j   (kj) (5)
with j() dened by equation (1). Because the rms foresee the tight-
ening of the allocation rule under ex post regulation, and know that the
regulators commitment is credible under ex ante regulation, the rst or-
der conditions to this maximization problem di¤er under the two regulatory
regimes. We analyze ex ante and ex post regulation in the next subsections
2.2.1 and 2.2.2, respectively.
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2.2.1 Ex ante regulation
Under ex ante regulation, the rst order condition to the maximization prob-
lem (5) is given by (see the appendix):
1(k
j) =
ej
kj
(6)
Anticipating the equilibrium in stage 2, equation (6) governs the rms
choice of technology kj in stage 1. From Lemma 1 we know that increasing
(or introducing) j in one or more sectors will increase the permit price .
Thus, we see that the RHS of equation (6) will increase for sectors with
unchanged or higher emissions, and increase or decrease for other sectors
when j increases. As 11(kj)  0, and the RHS is decreasing in kj, it
follows that the technology parameter kj will increase for the former group
of sectors, and increase or decrease for the other sectors. In particular, if the
allocation factor is increased for a single sector, it is optimal for this sector
to increase its technology investments. Moreover, if the allocation factors are
increased so as to keep sectoral emissions unchanged, technology investments
will increase for all sectors.
We summarize our results in the following proposition:
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Proposition 1 Assume interior solutions, perfect competition in all mar-
kets, and ex ante regulation. Then, we have:
i) Increasing the allocation factor in sector j 2 M leads to higher tech-
nology investments in this sector. Technology investments in other sectors
l 2Mn fjg may either increase or decrease.
ii) Increasing the allocation factor in all sectors, so that sectoral emissions
remain unchanged, leads to higher technology investments in all sectors.
Proof. The proposition follows from the discussion above.
Note in particular that the proposition is relevant when going from an
ETS with auctioning or lump sum (grandfathered) allocation to output-based
allocation. If the regulator has credibly committed to a xed (benchmark)
allocation factor, output-based allocation will tend to induce employment
of less emission-intensive technologies than auctioning or grandfathered per-
mits.
2.2.2 Ex post regulation
Under ex post regulation, the allocation factor is given by j = jf( 1
nj
P
i2Nj k
i).
Remember that we interpret a higher sector specic constant j > 0 as a gen-
erosity parameter, while f() captures the regulators possible response to the
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rmstechnology investments (ratcheting). It is straightforward to show that
the results derived for the allocation factor j in Lemma 1 applies to the gen-
erosity parameter j with this specication of the allocation rule. The rst or-
der condition to the maximization problem (5), with j = jf( 1
nj
P
i2Nj k
i),
is given by (see the appendix):13
1(k
j) = 

ej
kj
+ qj
j
nj
df
dkj

(7)
We will now discuss the e¤ects on kj of increasing the generosity para-
meter j. The rst term on the RHS corresponds to the RHS of equation (6)
and, hence, tend to increase the rmsinvestments as the regulator increases
the generosity parameter. However, the regulator may tighten the allocation
rule before stage 2 in response to the rmsinvestment. This e¤ect, which
reduces the rms incentives to invest, is captured by the term qj 
j
nj
df
dkj
< 0
in the second term on the RHS of equation (7). Intuitively, the rmsincen-
tives to implement advanced technology is reduced if the investment triggers
a tightening of the allocation factor, and thereby less free permits in stage 2.
This is the so-called ratcheting e¤ect, see, e.g., Downing and White (1986).
We see from equation (7) that the strength of the ratcheting e¤ect increases
13We used dfdki =
df
dkj for i 2 N j (rms are identical within any sector j 2M).
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in the generosity of the allocation rule as given by j.
It follows that an increase in j has one positive and one negative ef-
fect on the rmsinvestment level kj, through the rst and second term on
the RHS of equation (7), respectively. Therefore, the sign of the change in
the RHS of (7) induced by a more generous allocation rule is ambiguous (in
general). On the other hand, if the allocation factor is (perceived) approx-
imately insensitive to the rms choice of technology, we obtain the same
conclusions as in Proposition 1. In this respect, we observe from equation
(7) that the strength of the ratcheting e¤ect declines in the number of rms
nj. Note that this observation follows from our formulation of the allocation
rule j = jf( 1
nj
P
i2Nj k
i) under ex post regulation, and may not hold under
alternative specications
We sum up our ndings in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Assume interior solutions, perfect competition in all mar-
kets, and ex post regulation. Then, increasing the generosity of the allocation
rule in sector j 2 M , as given by j, may either increase or decrease tech-
nology investments in any sector j0 2M .
Proof. The proposition follows from the discussion above.
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The intuition behind the Proposition is straightforward. First, a more
generous allocation rule increases the rmsproduction. Therefore, for any
given emissions cap and technology, the rms operate at higher costs be-
cause their emissions intensity must be lower. The equilibrium permit price
increases. These results follow from Lemma 1. The higher permit price
then increases the rms incentives to invest in advanced abatement tech-
nology. Second, the regulator may adjust the benchmarking parameter in
response to this investment. If so, investment in technology will involve less
free allowances in the future. This ratcheting e¤ect (which increases in the
generosity of the allocation rule) imposes an additional cost on investment
that reduces the rmsincentives to invest in technology.
Should rms regulated by the EU ETS be concerned about the above-
mentioned ratcheting e¤ect, or is ex ante regulation a better description of
this system? During the third phase, lasting eight years, there will be no
ratcheting  the benchmark parameters are xed up to 2020. After 2020,
however, the answer to this question is not clear, but it seems reasonable to
believe that the benchmark parameters may be adjusted in line with tech-
nological developments.14 Should individual rms be concerned about their
14In the EU ETS, the allocation factor will depend on the average of the 10% most
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own inuence on future benchmark parameters? If we look at the number
of rms in each subsector having its own benchmark parameter, the number
varies a lot. In some subsectors the number is so large that an individual rm
has limited inuence unless it is really in the front and the allocation factor
is determined based on best available technologies. In other subsectors the
number of rms is well below ten, and thus individual rms may have signif-
icant impact on future benchmark parameters. The chemical industry may
be an illustrative example. This sector consists of several subsectors with
separate benchmark parameters. On the one hand, there were 115 plants
covered by the EU ETS in 2006 that produced nitric acid, accounting for 41
Mt CO2-equivalents.15 Even though several of these plants are operated by
the same company, each companys inuence on the allocation rule is likely to
be modest. On the other hand, there were only 5 plants (4 companies) that
produced apidic acid in the EU ETS in 2006, accounting for 13 Mt CO2-
equivalents. These rms may expect investment in abatement equipment
e¢ cient installations. In our model framework, with identical rms in each sector, and
thus equal kj across all rms in sector j, we are not able to analyze the impacts of di¤erent
variants of allocation rules.
15Facts on the chemical sector in the EU ETS in this paragraph are fetched from Ecofys
(2009). See also http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm for more details.
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today to induce less free permits per unit produced from 2020 onwards.
3 Sector heterogeneity
In this section we present some simple comparative statics in order to explore
the relationship between rmscost structures and output-based regulation.
We limit the analysis to the case with two sectors M = fj; lg, with cost
functions cj(qj; kjej) and cl(ql; klel). Because we focus on heterogeneous cost
structures, we assume that the two sectors face the same regulation, i.e.  =
j = l. Observe that the binding emissions cap implies njdej + nldel = 0.16
Therefore, the equilibrium emissions from the l-sector must decrease if the
j-sector increases its emissions and vice versa. We will henceforth assume
that the increase in the generosity of the allocation rule induces a change
in the rms emissions (i.e., dej; del 6= 0 )17. Which sector will increase its
emissions? The denominator Xj in equation (4) is positive. Hence, it a¤ects
16Using derivatives here is slightly awkward, because it is limited to very small changes.
An alternative would be to use di¤erential notation and assume that the larger changes
examined shared sign with the smaller changes examined in previous sections:
17If dej = del = 0 rms in both sectors would increase their investments under ex-ante
regulation due the increase in permit price (cf. equation 6), while we have ambiguity under
ex post regulation (cf. equation 7).
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the size of the elements in equation (4), but not the sign. Thus, it is left
to the nominator to determine the signs of the elements in the substitution
matrix (4). Let us begin with de
d
and de
d
. Note that  and  in the RHS
of equation (4) are equal across the two sectors. Therefore, we must have
dej
d
> 0 and de
l
d
< 0 if and only if cj11 < c
l
11 (remember that
d
d
> 0 by Lemma
1). Let cj11 < c
l
11. It then follows from the rst order condition (3) that
dqj
d
> 0. It is indeterminate whether the l sector increases or decreases its
production (cf. equation 3). Thus, we may have dq
j
d
> 0 and dq
l
d
> 0 even
tough aggregate emissions are constant.
Can we say something more about the sign of dq
l
d
? Assume, for the sake
of the argument, that the rmsproduction functions are Leontief in q and
e. Then the sign of dq is equal to the sign of de for both types of rms,
which implies that dq
l
d
< 0 when cj11 < c
l
11. With a more exible production
function we may have dq
l
d
> 0, however.
Also, it can be seen from equation (2) that the rms in sector j increase
their production more than the rms in sector l, given cj11 < c
l
11. How?
We know that the LHS of this equation are equal for both types of rms.
Moreover, we have established that our assumption cj11 < c
l
11 entails
dej
d
> 0
and de
l
d
< 0. Therefore, we must have dqj > dql in order to retain the
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equality in equation (2) (remember that c12  0). This increases the demand
for emissions from rms in sector j relative to that of the rms in sector l.
Intuitively, cj11 < c
l
11 implies that the marginal production cost curve of
rms in sector j is atter than the marginal production cost curve of rms
in sector l. Therefore, and because the product prices are exogenous, rms
in sector j increases production more than rms in sector l in response to a
subsidy to production (in the form of free permits per unit produced).
The results in the paragraphs above and equation (6) imply that dk
j
d
> 0
under ex ante regulation. Under ex post regulation we have dk
j
d
> 0 if each
rm perceives the allocation factor to be su¢ ciently insensitive to its own
technology investment, e.g., because the number of rms in the sector is high
(cf. equation 7). The sign of dk
l
d
is ambiguous under ex ante (and thereby
also ex post) regulation, cf. equation (6). However, rearranging equation
(6), we get kl1(kl) = el. A similar equation holds for the rms in sector
j. Adding up these two equations, we get kl1(kl) + kj1(kj) = 
 
el + ej

.
Under the assumption of linear technology investment cost functions (k),
di¤erentiation of this equation yields

dkl
d
+ dk
j
d

1 =
d
d
 
el + ej

> 0. This
implies that total investment costs and the aggregate investment level kj+kl
increase in the generosity of the allocation rule. The reason is that output-
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based allocation increases the permit price, which again induces stronger
incentives to invest in clean technology. In general, however, the sign of the
change in aggregate investment depends on the shape of the investment cost
function (k) and the levels of kj and kl before the change in the allocation
rule.
We summarize in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Assume ex ante regulation and two sectors M = fj; lg, with
cj11 < c
l
11 and  = 
j = l. Then we have dk
j
d
> 0 and dk
l
d
7 0. Moreover, the
aggregate investment level kj+kl increases in the generosity of the allocation
factor if 11(k) = 0.
Proof. The proposition follows from the discussion above.
Note that a similar result could be established with respect to the steep-
ness of the inverse demand function in the case of an endogenous product
price. That is, ceteris paribus, if rms in sector l face a steeper inverse
demand function than rms in sector j, and the regulator increases the gen-
erosity of the allocation rule, we get higher emissions from sector j and lower
emissions from sector l. This implies dk
j
d
> 0 and dk
l
d
7 0. We last observe
that the analysis above is analogous with analysis of two types of rms op-
erating in one single sector, given that the product prices satisfy pj = pl and
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the rms produce a homogenous good.
4 Output-based refunding of an emissions tax
In this section we extend the previous analysis to output-based refunding
of emission payments. The major departure from our previous analysis is
that the price of emissions is now xed, while aggregate emissions become an
endogenous variable. Moreover, the rms do not receive free permits based
on their production levels, but a monetary payment.
Without a cap on aggregate emissions, the rst order conditions (2) and
(3) alone governs the rmsactions, with  now referring to the constant
emissions tax. The e¤ects of j on the rmsactions are still given by equa-
tion (4), but with d = 0. So, while output based allocation under emissions
trading entailed a production subsidy and higher production costs (through
the higher permit price), output-based refunding of an emissions tax only fea-
tures the production subsidy. This yields dq
j
dj
> 0 and de
j
dj
> 0 (cf. equation 4
with d = 0). Also, because the tax is constant, increasing the allocation fac-
tor in sector j has no e¤ect on rms in other sectors l 6= j covered by the tax
regime. Naturally, this result hinges on our assumption about independency
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between sectors, both with regard to input and output markets.
The analysis of the rmsinvestment decisions in stage 1 is analogue to
the case with output-based allocation under emissions trading, and the equa-
tions (6) and (7) still apply. However, while both  and ej was endogenous in
the previous analysis,  is now xed. Otherwise, the interpretation of these
equations are very similar to our previous discussion, and will not be re-
peated here. We state the following result regarding output-based refunding
of emission payments:
Proposition 4 Assume interior solutions, perfect competition in all mar-
kets, and ex ante regulation. Then, increasing the output-based refunding
in sector j 2 M leads to higher technology investments kj in this sector.
Technology investments in other sectors l 6= j are una¤ected.
Proof. The proposition follows from equation (4) and (6), and the discussion
above.
As in our analysis of output-based allocation under emissions trading,
a more generous refunding rule j increases technology investment kj in
the particular case where the allocation factor is (perceived) insensitive to
the rmschoice of technology. As an example, the allocation factor in the
Swedish NOx scheme with output-based refunding of emission payments is
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given by the tax rate times the fraction of total emissions divided by total
production. Hence, the rmsincentives to invest in new equipment would
decline due to the ratcheting e¤ect if investment would lead to a substantial
decline in this fraction. This is not very likely given the high number of
(fairly equally sized) rms.18
5 Conclusion
Allocation of emission allowances may a¤ect rms incentives to invest in
clean technologies. In this paper we showed that output-based allocation
tends to stimulate such investments in sectors encompassed by the allocation
rule, given that individual rms do not assume the regulator to tighten the
allocation rule as a consequence of their investments. The explanation is
that output-based allocation creates an implicit subsidy to the rmsout-
put, which increases production, leads to a higher price of allowances, and
thus increases the incentives to invest in clean technologies. On the other
hand, if the rms expect the regulator to tighten the allocation rule after ob-
serving their clean technology investment, the rmsincentives to invest are
18365 units participated in the Swedish NOx scheme in 2006, with the largest unit having
an output share of 2.2%, see Sterner and Isaksson (2006).
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moderated. If strong, this last e¤ect may outweigh the enhanced investment
incentives induced by increased output and higher allowance price. For sec-
tors regulated by the ETS, but with no or unchanged allocation factor, the
e¤ects on investments are ambiguous. The reason is that a higher allowance
price and lower emissions (due to the higher price) pull in opposite directions
with respect to investment incentives.
Our analysis featured some assumptions that should be commented on.
First, we assumed that product and factor markets are independent across
sectors participating in the ETS. Without this assumption, an increase in
the allocation rule would have additional spillover e¤ects, dependent on e.g.
whether the products are complements or substitutes. Second, the rms are
allocated free permits proportional to production in the current period in
our model. In reality, however, output-based allocation may give rms free
permits today based on production (or capacity) in some previous period.
Still, the key characteristic of output-based allocation is the implicit output
subsidy provided by the allocation rule. Third, the main part of our analysis
assumed identical rms within each sector. Without this assumption, our
results would be rm dependent (not sector specic) and less clear-cut. In
general, however, we nd that a more generous allocation rule under ex ante
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regulation will increase the technology investments of those rms that do not
decrease their emissions in the new equilibrium.
Finally, we have examined the special cases of respectively no and imme-
diate tightening of the allocation factor in response to rmsinvestments. It
may be more realistic to assume that there is a delayed ratcheting, i.e., that
the regulator responds to the rmsinvestments in a subsequent period. For
example, the EU ETS will not revisit its allocation rules before 2020, but
may possibly update the allocation factors in the fourth phase (post-2020)
based on rms technologies in the third phase (pre-2020). Our model is
easily extended to feature such a delay, which can be seen as a combination
of the ex ante and the ex post analysis above. Naturally, the e¤ect of a
more generous allocation rule would then depend on the time delay before
the regulatory response, and the corresponding discount factor.
A Appendix
Derivation of equation (4): Di¤erentiating the rst order conditions (2)
and (3) wrt.  we get (omitting heading j):
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 + d = c11
dq
d
+ kc12
de
d
d =  kc12 dq
d
  k2c22 de
d
;
while di¤erentiation wrt.  yields:
 = c11
dq
d
+ kc12
de
d
1 =  kc12 dq
d
  k2c22 de
d
:
Rewriting, using matrix notation, we get.
0BB@ c11 kc12
 kc12  k2c22
1CCA
0BB@ dqd dqd
de
d
de
d
1CCA =
0BB@  + d 
d 1
1CCA ;
which may be written AY = B (with the obvious denitions of matrixes).
The solution for the substitution matrix Y is then given by Y = A 1B, where
the inverse is given by:
A 1 =
1
k2 [c11c22   (c21)2]
0BB@ k2c22  
  c11
1CCA :
Hence, the solution for Y is given by:
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0BB@ dqd dqd
de
d
de
d
1CCA = 1k2 [c11c22   (c21)2]
0BB@ k2c22 + (k2c22   )d k2c22   
2 + (   c11)d    c11
1CCA ;
which is equation (4).
Derivation of the rst order conditions (6) and (7): Let heading
ij denote any rm i 2 N j in sector j 2M . The maximization problem under
ex post regulation is given by:
ij  max
kij
"
pjqij   cj(qij; kijeij)  (eij   jf( 1
nj
X
i2Nj
ki)qij)  j(kij)
#
;
with rst order condition
dij
dkij
=

pj   cj1() + 
j
nj
f()

dqij
dkij
   + kijcj2() deijdkij   cj2()eij + qij jnj dfdkij   k(kij) = 0
,  cj2()eij + qij
j
nj
df
dkij
  k(kij) = 0
, k(kij) = 

eij
kij
+ qij
j
nj
df
dkij

;
where we used the rst order conditions (2) and (3) in the derivation of
the two last equalities. The last equation is identical to (7) when we omit the
rm specic notation i (due to the assumption of identical rms). Finally,
ex ante regulation implies df
dkij
= 0, which yields equation (6).
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